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 F
 Q u e u e s 
Resource allocation, income redistribution and 
agricultural pricing policies in Kenya 
V 
Lawrence Smith 
Kenya's present agricultural pricing policy originated in the period 
when large scale European Farmers were politically powerful and able to obtain 
Government support for a considerable degree of protection in domestic markets, 
and when exportable surpluses of many commodities could be subsidised by high 
income domestic consumers. Policies'such as those which imply a misallocatio.. 
of resources through distortions in the price system frequently contain the 
seeds of their own destruction. 
In this case the growth of the small scale African farming sector, 
together with technological advances, has. caused the supply curves for many 
commodities to shift markedly to the right. Coupled with high producer prices 
these supply curve shifts have led to large increases in outppt which the 
domestic market has been unable to absorb at current consumer prices. Thus 
commodities have been, exported "at a loss,
!:
 , this loss-being made up by delibera-
tely raising domestic consumer prices above the.normal market level. As the 
proportion of total production which has to be exported increases, _ the 
domestic consumer price has to be raised even farther to meet the export loss. 
Since these subsidy arrangements are 011 a commodity basis we find some instances, 
such as maize, where the heaviest relative incidence of the subsidy is borne by 
the lowest income urban dwellers. 
The extent of income redistribution created 
' '"by /fchp e^ist irig^IJ'i.
0
 i n£_JP-2.9S. 
It is apparent that the existing pricing rules create ( implicitly or 
explicitly ) income redistribution effects when compared
 T
.tfith optimum resource 
allocation rules, (see Appendix) These effects reinforced by import taxes, 
licensing quotas or outright bans on the import of agricultural products from 
other countries. In this section some crude estimates of the extent of these flows 
is made, but more attention is given to the direction of these flows, as it is the 
author's contention that there is no consistent principle regarding income 
redistribution underlying these flows. For ease of presentation the existing 
flows are divided under four general headings. 
1. Transfers from producers to urban consumers 
From the evidence available it would seem that the producer price for 
high grade beef paid by KMC has been below export parity price, ana the domestic 
consumer price for all beef has been below export parity price plus marketing 
costs. Thus in effect producers have been subsidising domestic consumers and 
there has been an effective income transfer from the rural areas' (to the urban 
areas (mainly liairobi^. The-extent of this transfer was probably in the region 
of £K100,000 in 1967 „ The reason for this transfer has probably been the 
political difficulty of raising the producer (• and concurrently) consumer price 
of beef given the importance of beef in the cost-of-living index for low income 
Nairobi workers. The "cost" of not raising prices has been a retarding of the 
growth of the Kenyan beef industry, the continued high level of production of 
commodities with a lower real value added but which were financially more attractive 
to individual farmers given the low producer price for beef, a loss of potential 
income by existing beef producers and a loss of potential foreign exchange earn-
ings. Recent price changes have partially rectified this imbalance but there 
could still be a case (on resource allocation grounds) for a further rise in 
producer and domestic consumer prices. 
2. Transfers^from consumers to producers 
For maize and wheat, producer prices are currently above export parity 
leading to subsidies by domestic consumers ( and also tax payers ) to 
producers. At the moment the producer price of maize is shs 25/- 200 lb. net 
into Maize and Produce Board (MFB) stores and the price to domestic consumer 
ex-MPB stores in the producing regions is approximately shs 37/—» Allowing 
a generous margin of shs 4/- for MFB overheads it would appear that there is an 
income transfer of shs 8/- per 200 It, . from consumers to producers on all 
maize sold internally. With domestic sales of approximately one million bags 
per year this represents an income transfer of around £K400,000 from consumers 
to producers. At the moment there is also an income transfer from taxpayers to 
producers as the Government has guaranteed to meet any losses made by the EEL 
on exports and not covered by the subsidy from domestic consumers, up to a 
maximum of shs 14/- per bag. The size of this subsidy in any one year depends on 
the amount of maize exported and the market price but in 1967/8 the Government 
paid a subsidy of £K2million with £K 634,448 being carried forward as recoverable 
from the Government. 
For wheat the current producer price is shs 40/- per 200 lb. (naked Grade 
2b producers station f.o.r.) and the current ex-Wheat Board store price to 
millers is approximately shs 55/lO. If there were no necessity to subsidise 
exports we might expect the ex-Wheat Board store price to fall at least to 
shs 44/- oven if the equilibrum producer price remained at the present producer 
price of shs 40/-. As 1.2 m bags of wheat are consumed in Kenya we can 
estimate that a sum in excess of £K650,000 will, be transferred this year, from 
domestic consumers to producers. An oven larger sum would have been transferred 
from taxpayers to producers had it proved possible to export surplus wheat at 
somewhere near the lowest price allowed under the International Wheat 
Agreement. The equity of this transfer is open to serious question when it is 
realised that 400 large scale farmers grow Over 60 per cent of'Kenya's wheat. 
For milk and some dairy products the current producer price is also above-
export parity price and the low prices obtained for exports are compensated for 
by higher prices charged for milk and some of the dairy products sold internally 
in Kenya. More, empirical work would have to be conducted in this area before 
quantitative estimates on the size of transfers can bo made. 
The sugar industry is currently protected by a, high level of import duty in 
addition to a further surcharge on imported supplies made by the single importing 
agency to bring the price of imported sugar up to the price, paid to domestic^ 
sugar manufacturers. It would appear that in 1968 domestic manufacturers were 
paid some £9 per ton more than the relevant import parity price , which on a 
production of over 81,000 tons of sugar amounts to a transfer of approximately 
£K730,000 from consumers t.o manufacturers (and presumably producers) mainly in 
the Central Nyanza district. At tlid samcT'time an excise duty of £K2.494m was 
collected in 1968 on sugar by the Central Government. This represents a purchase 
tax rate of 40 per cent. 
3• Transfers from producers to other producers 
The pricing rules designed to optimise resource allocation between various 
agricultural commodities imply that the individual producer should be paid a 
farm-gate price equivalent to the marginal value of the product as it loaves the 
farm gate. In other words this farm-gate value will vary with location as the 
costs of transfer have to be deducted from the value of the product in the final 
market place. 
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For many commodities where a "free
1
"' marketing system operates and where producers have 
access to adequate market information this docs indeed occur. For many major 
commodities however a uniform ex-farmgate price is paid for a district, a province or 
even the whole country, the costs of transport being pooled and a uniform transport 
deduction being made per unit of throughput. 
The effects of this system are seen most clearly in the case of a product like 
maize where a continuous exportable surplus is assumed and the producer price under 
the proposed pricing rules would be geared to the f.o.b. Mombasa price. Under this 
system a series of railhead, prices would be. established by deducting the railage 
charge from the f.o.b. Mombasa price and either making producers responsible for 
their own transport to the railhead and. paying on a delivered railhead basis or by 
making a further deduction which varies either directly or proportionally with the 
distance of the producer ( or the producers' market place) from the railhead and 
paying on a delivcred-markc-t place basis. At the moment a uniform railage deduction 
is made from all producers regardless of their distance from Mombasa and then the 
transport costs incurred in moving produce from, local markets to FPB railhead ores 
in a district or a province are pooled between all producers in that area. 
Thus at the moment producers nearest the Coast r-ire subsidising those up-country 
and those nearest the railhead are subsidising those at a distance from the rail-
head. The potential magnitude of this income transfer is of considerable importance 
as Table 1 shows 
Table 1 Transport deduction for producers located near railhead 








Existing pricing rules 
(Transport pool charge plus 







Proposed pricing rules 





Transport pool arrangements of varying types are in operation for most of the 
other major commodities and are great favourites of farmers' unions in all 
countries of the xrorld. One feature in their favour is that they lead to some 
simplification of administration where producers he,ve to be paid from a central 
organisation or where there arc monopolistic tendencies in the transport system 
otherwise it would seem preferable on resource'allocation grounds to make 
producers responsible for transport costs. 
This in its turn would create a new income redistribution cffect as it 
would increase the profitability of farming near market centres. If there were 
a Toell developed land market we would expect to sec these locational advantages 
reflected in higher land rents in favoured locations and intensified land use 
in these areas. In the absence of this land market the resource alloc tion effect 
of removing transport pools is somewhat dampened because although there is an 
incentive for producers near market centres to intensify production there is no 
compulsion for them to do so. In the latter case a land tax based on locational 
and potential productivity factors might produce the necessary stimulus to 
optimal use of land, just as in the first case of a well developed land market 
a similar land tax, or even income tax could be used to cream of the economic 
rents accruing to the owners of the land with favourable location aspects. 
The removal of transport pools also has the effect of contracting the extensive 
margin of production. This is one case where there may be a strong divergence 
between private and social marginal costs and some form of subsidy to remote areas 
may be justified. 
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If this divergence does occur it is probably desirable that it is a general 
transport subsidy which comes directly from tire Central Government and not from 
certain other producers who just happen to produce the same commodity as those in 
remote areas. 
4. Transfers from overseas consumers to domestic producers 
This form of income, transfer is becoming of less importance than perhaps it 
was formally as it depends either on the exploitation of an overseas inelastic ' 
market, as was probably the case for pyrothrum before synthetic substitutes were 
discovered, or the presence of an overseas market controlled by quota arrange-
ments so that supplies are deliberately restricted. If the ability to produce 
these commodities is restricted by individual producer quotas then the marginal 
revenue accruing to the producer may be above his marginal costs of production and 
this places him in a favoured position vis-a-vis other producers who do not possess 
quotas. As discussed in the Appendix, this income redistribution effect can be 
taxed away and to a greater or lesser extent it is for coffee through the export 
tax, but there is no similar tax for pyrcthrum. 
The haphazard nature of the income flows hinted at above leads one to 
question iirhether there is a rational approach to income redistribution within 
Kenya's agricultural policy, or whether these flows are created as by-products of 
other actions. For instance it does seem that income redistribution in the maize 
and wheat industries although deliberate in the past when producers had more say 
in setting prices at the present time is a temporary phenomenon and is purely the 
outcome of the policy of making the industries self financing. For beef the 
Government docs seem to be gearingproduccr prices mere to export parity..Theproblem 
here is that, for a variety of reasons, the consumer price of beef can only be 
raised slowly. Whether the Government will modify the present pricing system in 
the dairy industry remains to be seen—dairy products in all countries create some 
notoriously complex pricing problemsand at the moment the whole of this topic 
is under
-
 renrfedw. For pyrcthrum and coffee the size of the income transfer is at 
present questionable due to changed marketing possibilities in the case of 
pyrethrum and increased costs of production and a lower world market price in the 
case of coffee. There arc of course, income transfers associated with transport 
pool arrangements but it is doubtful whether a need for income redistribution was 
the reason for initiating the pools, although further research would be needed to 
verify this contention. This leaves us then with sugar as the sole major 
commodity in which there is an obvious and perhaps deliberate income transfer, but 
even in this case it could be that" sugar manufacturers and producers are being 
protected on infant industry grounds. This would be confirmed if the ex-factory 
price of sugar uas reduced t.o below import parity price levels as self sufficiency 
approaches. 
We may safely conclude from this that it is unlikely that income redistribution 
is a major policy objective in Kenya's agricultural policy. 
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Is . thfr agricultural pricing systorn an, efficient 
IP-Pjjhod of achi_cving_ iriOome_ redi_stril^'ion*?' 
Although income distribution may not be a deliberate policy objective in 
Kenya's existing pricing policy, it is interesting to speculate whether the 
agricultural pricing system could be the most efficient instrument to achieve 
income redistribution in a country at a similar stage of development as Kenya. 
There are two difficulties in analysing this problem. First, one is concerned 
with the major section of the economy & the secondary effects of income 
distribution are important but difficult to trace. Secondly for policy i s s u e d 
one is concerned with dynamic aspects of the problem whereas one can only clearly 
analyse the static issues. Thus the following comments should be treated as 
preliminary thoughts in a field of research which requires much more 
development. 
The most likely aim of a Government in trying to achieve some degree of 
income redistribution is to reduce the urban-rural earnings differential. How-
ever there are possibly three separate motives for this action- First, it may 
be an objective on straight forward grounds of equity. Second the aim may be 
to slow down the. rate of rural-urban migration to avoid the problems of urban 
unemployment. Third, the intention may be to generate more income and/or 
employment opportunities in the rural areas because of the anticipated rapid 
increase in rural population. 
If the Government is concerned mainly with the equity consideration then , 
the policy should aim.at transfering income from the rich to the poor regardless 
of location. In Kenya, and probably in other countries, it is naive to assume 
that ail urban,dwellers are richer than all rural dwellers, or that all rural 
dwellers are equally poor. Moreover the method of redistribution usually chosen, 
namely a food tax and agricultural subsidy on an individual commodity basis is 
notoriously inefficient (e.g. maize) in achieving an equitable distribution of 
income. .Although realising the practical problems, a more appropriate solution, 
to the equity objective is a more progressive form of income tax, including 
perhpas some form of negative rate for the very poor. 
The wisdom of redistributing income through the medium of the agricultural 
pricing system as a method of slowing down the rate of rural-urban migration 
is more difficult to assess. At a first glance, a tax on foodstuffs consumed in 
the urban areas with the proceeds directed to those areas where the propensity 
to migrate is highest might seem to bo quite useful. However to be successful we 
would have to ensure that the higher cost of living in urban areas created by 
the tax acted as a detorent to.potential migrants. What is the possibility of 
higher food prices leading to increased wage demands by urban workers, with 
real incomes for urban workers remaining unchanged but with the higher wages 
being reflected in increased prices for industrial output? Furthermore, the 
form in which the food tax is remitted to the rural areas will alter its effective-
ness. To be successful the proceeds of the tax have to get to potential migrants 
in a form hich induces them to .stay in the rural areas. Straight forwa-rd 
remittance in the form of higher prices for a few commodities may not be sufficient. 
Finally, the causes for migration are not sufficiently well known for us to be 
certain that closing the urban-rural earnings gap per se will prevent migration, 
and in any case one has to be sure that tho subsidised persons are the potential 
migrants. 
Will income redistribution help to generate more income and/or employment 
opportunities in the rural areas? This depends very much on the form of the 
food tax and the elasticity of demand for food stuffs. Whilst a general ad 
valorem food tax will raise rural monetary incomes if the overall demand for 
food is price i n e l a s t i c a food tax on a single commodity may reduce the 
quantity consumed if substitutes are available. One method which should ensure 
some generation of incomes for the rural areas is if a food tax is pla.ced on • a 
product with a relatively inelastic demand, and the proceeds of the tax are used to 
raise the producer price of a commodity with an clastic demand ( e.g. an export 
crop) 
Even so, there are linatatrarrsto the effectiveness of this method. In the first 
place, although we can expect some increase in total monetary incomes in the 
rural secotr, the amount to which total real incomes will depend on the overall 
effects of the tax on the urban:rural terms of trade. Second, owing to the relative 
size of the urban and the rural populations, a high incidence of food tax is 
required to make any appreciable impact on rural per capita incomes. 
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Could wo expect the introduction of the proposed pricing rules to have any 
"beneficial effect on the-urban/rural earnings differential and on employment both 
in the urban and the~rursi '"sectors? If the existing pricing rules arc retained 
in Kenya producers will continue to be attracted to producing those commodities 
which yield the highest net return. These will tend to be those where the internal 
demand is sufficiently inelastic that domestic prices can be raised to a level to 
offget. looses on exports or where production quotas are used to restrict supply. 
Besides its other defects, this system does not appear conducive to an 
expansionist agricultural policy. Using the proposed rules the cost of foodstuffs 
in urban areas will be export parity plus marketing costs, or equilibrium price 
plus marketing costs if the equilibrium price is above export parity price. The 
of f e e o f introducing this change at the moment in Kenya should be to lower the 
cost of living in the urban areas. Urban dwellers may then spend a lower propor-
tion of their income on foodstuffs or spend the same proportion either purchasing 
a greater quantity of foodstuffs or purchasing"higher quality" products (which 
, may infer more nutritions products or products with a higher service content e.g. 
^ j y more convenient or more packaging). Thus in the short run we would not expect the 
L^XJ
3
 flow of money income to the rural sector to increase, indeed it may even decrease. 
On the other hand, the decline in the price index for food shall reduce the 
pressure for wage increases and slow down the. rate of increase in the price of 
goods and services produced in the urban .areas, Ptabi 1 isir;gthe cost of inputs 
purchased by.the rural sector and to some extent redressing the terms of trade 
between rural and urban sectors. 
In the longer run. however, we would expect the lower prices of foodstuffs in 
the urban areas to lead to a ligher percentage of incomes being spent on non-food 
items, so that manufacturing and service industries experience an increased demand. 
Concurrently in the rural sector application of the proposed pricing rules should 
have led to a reallocation of resources from the present pattern to one that leads 
to an increase in the real'output of the rural sector. Whether monetary incomes 
in the rural sector also rise will of course depend on international price movements 
for agricultural products, . but if the rural sector have been given, good advice on 
likely price trends and assistance in becoming more flexible between commodities 
one would hope that total monetary'income will also rise. Thus the use of the 
proposed pricing rules holds out the hope (if nothing more) that incomes and employ-
ment opportunities in both the urban and rural sectors will be encouraged. Whether 
this increases or decreases the rate of rural/urban migration remains in doubt. As 
stated earlier it could Hell. be.that the rural/urban income gap is not the critical 
factor in migration and that it is employment ;opportunities which are of importance. 
In this case the proposed pricing rules should assist the unemployment problem by 
increasing (slightly) job opportunities in towns but increasing rural employment 
opportunities, both farm and non—farm, even more. ...... 
Although the evidence presented here is tentative in the extreme, it docs 
suggest that in the long run the policy which is likely to assist the development 
of the rural sector is in fact a.policy which makes, no overt attempt at income 
redistribution from the urban,to the rural-sector. For a country like Kenya which 
is fairly well advanced into the monetary economy, which has to rely on the 
agricultural sector for a large proportion of national product and foreign exchange 
earnings, and is not in serious,balance of payments difficulties, the importance 
of achieving an optimum allocation of resources ( i n a dynamic context),is of 
paramount importance.. Remote areas do present special problems but modification of 
the proposed pricing rules is not likely to be the most efficient method of 
dealing with this problem. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. In 1967, approximately 40 per cent of KMC's throughput was from about 200 
established ranchers mainly in the Laikipia, llalcuru and Machakos districts. 
The larger portion of their supplies came from cattle traders representing 
numerous producers mainly from Nyanza, Kajiado and Machakos districts. 
2. Recent calculat ion by T.Jo Aldington from information presented in 
T.J. Aldington and F.A. Wilson (1968) The marketing of beef in Kenya 
I.D.S. Occasional Paper No. 3. 
3. In the absence of any firm data, the import parity price is used here as 
an approximation for the equilibrium price. This will give a conservative estimate 
of the "true'
:
 income transfer. 
A P P E IT D I X 
A^ProposGd Agricultural Pricing Policy for Kenya 
Over the past few years it has become increasingly obvious that Kenya's 
existing agricultural pri-cing policy i-s- both undesirable' on economic grounds 
and becoming unworkable financially.- The effects of the present pricing 
policies have led to pressures both to prevent further coetlatian in consumer 
prices and to halt the decline in producer prices. At the same time the 
Treasury is neither in a position to finance these losses indefinitely given 
the difficulties of raising sufficient Government revenue from the existing 
tax structure, nor even if it were would it be particularly willing to do 
so given the relatively favourable balance of payments situation. 
This financial "breakdown of the existing pricing arrangements has precipitated 
an interest in the creation of a pricing policy which is both workable and 
more suited to the conditions which Kenya is likely to face in the 1970's. 
Kenya is likely to have three major policy objectives which can be influenced 
by the agricultural pricing system. For instance given the projected population 
growth rate, the anticipated per capita real income increase and the rate 
of urbanisation, it is apparent that either domu^tic comercial food production 
' ' . will have to continue to expand at a fairly rapid rate or Kenya will have-
to import some foodstuffs in future years. At the same time Kenya may also 
wish to increase its foreign exchange earnings from agriculture byexpanding 
production of those commodities in which she has a comparative advantage. To 
maintain self sufficiency and to expand agricultural exports irould obviously 
call for a large increase in productivity from the agricultural sector and 
there could be conflict between the relative expansion of domestic or expoi ' 
commodities. In this case there might be strong pressure on political grounds 
to achieve self sufficiency at any cost whilst on economic grounds a more 
flexible trading policy might be desirable. 
Second, in common with many other countries there is increasing concern within 
Kenya both with the apparent urban-rural earnings differential and with the 
related (but by no means identical) problems of rural-urban migration and urban 
unemployment. Both problems. be -aggravated in the future if the urban-rural 
earnings gap widens-, and one 'imagines that It will be a policy objective; to try 
to prevent this happening. 
1 ' , I 
Third, as Helleiraer has recently argued-, the growing demand, for Government 
revenue may mean that more interest will be taken in taxing the agricultural sector 
and thi G X cLX clo pect may be incorporated in future pricing structures. 
These policy objectives are most likely to be met by a pricing system which 
aims solely at maximising the growth of GI.'P by achieving (in a dynamic context) 
an optimum allocation' bet ween''"a:g:Fi cultural"' cbmmoMti^s "~of' th^se resources which 
are currently employed in the agricultural sector. 
•The_ proposed^ pricing rules 
This optimum contribution of the agricultural sector should be achieved 
if for each agricultural commodity output is at a level where marginal (social) 
revenue is equated to marginal (social) coots, providing there is a purely 
competitive environment in the internal market both for the agricultural and the 
non-agricultural sectors. Although W© '71S SlilTi G dC a necessary condition for 
optimisation that producers are price takers in the domestic market ( they are 
not o.llowed to collude to exploit monopolistic power as this will distort consumer's 
preferences and lead to a non-optimisation of satisfaction), in export markets we 
require producers to act collectively to exploit monopoly power on foreign 
consumers wherever possible^, as from a national point of view we are not concerned 
with the- welfare of people outside Kenya. 
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The actual form of the pricing rule to he used to attain an optimum position 
varies with the type of market situation which faces Kenya, hut virtually every 
situation can he covered hy one of the four pricing rules which are developed 
below. These rules are presented in a simplified diagrammatic form and mere 
sophisticated models' may he required in practice. 
A . Domestic demand curve downward sloping (elastic or inelastic), export demand 
infinitely elastic at the world market price 
The domestic demand curve and the world demand curve (standardised on an 
f.o.b. basis) can be combined to form a total demand curve DD
e
 (Diagram I). Lot 
the supply curve be represented initially by S^, then Q will be produced with 
Q_ being sold on the domestic market at price- P .and Q Q icing exported at the 
JJ D 1 
same price. Thus providing the supply curve intersects the horizontal portion of 
the demand curve producer price should be set at the relevant export parity price 




— ' 1 
Q3 Q-Q QX Q2 
If the supply curve shifts to S
o !
 Q^ should be produced with Q^ again being 
sold on the domestic market but Q-^Qg being exported. If the supply curve 
intersects the total demand curve to the left of Q e.g. S^ producer price should 
D ^ 
be allowed to reach its own equilibrium at P^ and no produce should be exported. 
However, for any agricultural product the domestic producer price should not 
be allowed to rise above the long term import parity price for at this point it 
becomes more profitable to import that portion of total demand which domestic 
suppliers are not willing to produce at the import parity price. If the export 
parity price falls we would expect more to be sold on the domestic market. 
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Both Domestic and Export Demand Curves. Downward Sloping 
DIAGRAM, 2 
For the export market we are concerned with equating marginal cost and marginal 
revenue, whereas for the domestic market .we. arc concerned with equating marginal 
cost and price (because for an individual price taker facing an infinitely elastic 
demand curve at the ruling market price marginal revenue will equal price). Thus 
our total 'demand' curve DD' (Diagram 2) is a summation of the domestic demand 
curve (ARp) and the marginal revenue curve ( l % ) derived from the export, d „nd 
curve. If the supply curve intersects this total 'demand' curve at • Ql
s
 oQD will be 
sold on the domestic market at price Pi and OvE will be exported at a price ?2
c 
Producers should be paid the price PI, the m o n o p o l y ^ * P 2 per unit of exports 
being contributed to general Government revenue. (if it were distributed to 
producers the pooled price would encourage a greater 
marginal cost would exceed marginal revenue),. 
production that OQi i.e, 
Export Market Restricted by Export Quotas 
DIAGRAM 3 
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Let us assume that.the export quota for a crop is fixed by international 
agreement at Qg which can be sold at a price ?2° Furthermore there is a domestic 
market AR^ These two makrets can be combined to form a total demand curve 
DD
1
 (Diagram 3) which intersects the supply curve, S]_ at '41. The quantity OQs 
will be exported to satisfy the export quota and sold at a price P2« The domestic 
market will reccive a ruantity OQp at price Flo Producers will be paid a price 
Pi, the monopoly profit of"PiP2 obtained on each unit exported being allocated 
to general Government revenue. A similar analysis can be applied if there is a 
non-quota export market, but in this ease we would substitute the.marginal revenue 
curve of the non-quota market for the average revenue curve of the domestic 
market. If there were no markets other-than the quota market, producer price 
should be lowered to P3 which will call forth a quantity just sufficient to satisfy 
tho quota market. 
Pricing policies which allow producers to retain the economic rent resulting 
from the artificial restriction of supply such as occurs when production quotas are 
allocated to individual can be criticised on two grounds. First they tend to 
shelter inefficient producers who can remain in production because of the artificially 
r.'ised prices. Second they create a favoured group of producers. When there are 
technical reasons favouring the retention of quota systems and the direct payment 
to the producer of the full proceeds of the quota arrangements are unavoidable, 
these disadvantages can—be lessened either-by selling"all quotas periodically to 
those producers offering the highest bids, or by placing a levy on producers equal 
to the economic rent obtained by a reasonably efficient producer. 
D . Two or more domestic markets 
Producer price should be allowed to find its own equilibrium, or be set, at 
the point where the -supply curve, S, intersects the total demand curve DD* in 
Diagram 4 formed by the.summation of the two domestic demand curves ARi and A R
2 
At this produce price P-p 'OC^ will be supplied, OQ^ being demanded by the 
market represented by AR^ and 0Q
2
 by AR . Ho price discrimination between the 
two markets should be allowed^ that is, producers should remain price takers. 
_ 4 -
Proposed. Pricing Rule 
Existing Pricing Rule 
DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION EXPORTS 
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Proposed, pricing rules, existing pricing rules and policy objectives 
Although all the intricacies of possible trade-offs between policy objectives 
will not be discussed here, the effect on some of the- major possible policy 
objectives of moving from the existing pricing rules to the proposed pricing rulec 
can be illustrated very clearly by the use of simple diagrams. 
A» Domestic demand curve downward sloping, export demand curve infinitely 
elastic^at the world market price 
The proposed pricing rules are generalised in Diagram 5>A and the existing 
pricing rule in Diagram jH>, AR^.representing the domestic demand curve, MR^ 
being the corresponding marginal revenue curve,, The export parity price is 
represented by It is assumed that under the existing pricing rule that the 
producer price P is set above the exoort parity price P causing the domestic 
1 
consumer price (net of marketing costs) to be raised to F^ to compensate for 
exoort .losses. 
i Maximising contribution to national income 
Studying the two diagrams it is obvious that the use of the existing pricing 
rule does not load to a maximisation of real national income as an output is 
produced where marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue. It should therefore be 
possible to increase national income by diverting resources from this activity to 
others. 
Only if the marginal social cost curve (supply curve) were lower than the 
marginal private cost curve ( for example land .and/or labour had no alternative 
\ises) might the existing pricing rule be economically acceptable and consistent 
with maximising real national income. However one cannot assess the likelihood 
of this occurrence until the proposed pricing rules have been applied for a 
sufficient period to allow factor ovners to adjust to the new situation. This 
adjustment process is hampered at the moment because the gap between export parity 
price and actual producer price v.ries from commodity to commodity. 
ii Maximising foreign exchange earnings 
For the individual commodity shox-m in the diagrams it appears that foreign 
exchange earnings, are greater under the existing pricing rules than under the 
proposed pricing rules. 
However part of this is caused by artificially restricting comestic demand in 
order to raise revenue
 T
..hich is transferred to producers. The other part is 
achieved by the diversion of resources from other activities. How there are no 
a priori grounds for deciding whether these same resources used in other fields 
would have a greater or lesser'impact"on net foreign exchange earnings ( i.e. they 
could be used in import substitution industries as well as for direct exports). 
The Government could increase foreign exchange earnings from some products with-
out disturbing"the equation MC=MR by levying a tax on domestic purchases of the 
commodity and its substitutes and banning imports. This would restrict domestic 
consumption and make more of the commodity available for the export market, whilst 
at the same time increasing Government revenue by the amount of the tax. Of course 
if the Government were really intent a maximising foreign exchange earnings it 
could ration the quantity of certadn commodities consumed on the domestic market 
and these policies could be extended to a point where the whole output of a 
commodity wa,s exported. One can imagine the effect on domestic consumers' 
satisfaction! 
- 6 -
iii Maximising producers ' revenues 
This could he achieved Toy restricting supplies on the domestic market to 
that point where the marginal revenue derived from domestic sales (MR_) equals 
the marginal revenue derived from export sales (?-,)• This involves the 
maximum possible income transfer from consumers of this commodity to producers 
of this commodity. It could however increase or decrease the total domestic 
expenditure on agricultural commodities and would have important effects on the 
welfare and standard of living of consumers:.. Against .this it would increase 
foreign exchange earnings compared to the earnings derived from implementing the 
proposed pricing rule. The existing pricing rule which aims solely at a 'break 
even' policy docs not maximise producers revenue, and on a priori grounds one cannot 
state whether the existing pricing rules raise producers incomes above those 
which would exist if the proposed pricing rules were used this depends on the 
alternative uses to which the misallocatod resources could be applied. 
iv Maximising Government revenue 
Helleincr has recently argued 4 "if the desire is to raise government 
revenues with a minimum of distortion of the incentives which would result in 
the absence of such taxes and a minimum of discrimination (inequity), an 
attempt should be made to achieve equi-proportionate taxes on each crop. What 
is a neutral tax. system in this sense? This is by no means self-evident. It 
is best defined I believe, as one in which equal proportions of value added by 
the agricultural secotr are deducted in taxes from each ........ this is the 
same thing as total factor earnings in production - whether they are wages, 
interest, rent or profit'' 
This would seem to bo most readily obtained in practice by the use of an 
constant ad valorem tax on all agricultural products. It would be difficult to 
obtain the same state of neutrality by imposing taxes on the existing pricing 
system. 
v . Maximising consumer satisfaction 
These methods of transferring income from specific consumers to specific 
producers by means of raising consumer prices have the same consequences on 
consumer satisfaction that the ad hoc application of direct taxes have - namely, 
they distort the pattern of choices open to the consumer so that his optimum 
choice of goods under this pricing system yields him less satisfaction than on 
equivalent tax yield taken as indirect taxation. 
This system also creates problems of inequality if it is necessary to raise 
the price of a basic foodstuff, like maize, in order to offset export losses. 
In this case the effective incidence of the price rise is likely to fall most 
heavily on the poorest members of the community as the foodstuff will form a 
relatively high proportion of their household budget. 
3 . Both domestic and export demand curvcs downward sloping 
The main difference between the existing pricing rule and the proposed 
pricing rulefshown in Diagram 2) is that the monopoly profit of P P per 
1 2 
unit of exports tends to be passed on to producers. In order to prevent this 
higher producer price encouraging a larger output which could only be sold 
on the world export markets at a lower price /'thereby increasing the commodity's 
foreign exchange earnings but reducing its in&ome jrecourse is made to 
individual production quotas, leading to the problems which have been discussed 
earlier. The only redeeming feature of the present pricing rule is that the 
income transfer tends to be from overseas rather than domestic consumers to 
domestic producers of the commodity. Whether this is the best use of these 
monopoly profits is a matter for Government policy. 
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C • Export market restricted "ay export quotas 
Again the existing pricing rule uses quotas to achieve the optimum output, the 
monopoly profits accruing to producers, whilst in the proposed pricing system the 
optimum supply would he obtained by lowering producer price, monopoly profits 
accruing to the Government. In the case of coffee the presence of an export tax 
creams of a portion of the monopoly profits. However this is not a very efficient 
system as the tax is specific but the price and output of the crop tend to 
fluctuate, thus there may be occasions when the producers' contribution is 
greater than the economic rent. 
Two or more domestic markets 
In this market situation, exemplified by milk and dairy products the existing 
pricing rule is extremely complex. However the essential features arc that 
producers use their collective monopoly powers to cxercise a classic form of price 
discrimination in the domestic market, charging the consumer a higher price for 
milk used in liquid form then in manufactured form. At the same time a three-
tiered pricing system is practised between producers, "quota holders" "contract 
suppliers" and "non—contract suppliers
5,
 es,ch receiving different prices for their 
production. Thus xve have an income transfer from consumers to producers, but 
some producers obtain a greater benefit from this income transfer than others. 
Under the proposed pricing rules all producers would receive the same price for 
milk ( bef-re deduction of transport costs) and. consumers would pay for products 
based on milk content plus manufacturing costs. The producer price might be 
above or at export parity price depending on the position of the producers' supply 
curve relative to the total demand curve. (it is recognised that the imperfect 
nature of the export markets for milk products might create a stepped demand 
function and lead to problems with the normal concept of export parity. ) 
To summarise, it is extremely doubtful if the existing pricing rules lead 
to a maximisation of real national income, and their effects on foreign exchange 
earnings are indeterminate. They undoubtedly raise the domestic consumer price 
of foodstuffs, but the extent to which they raise the total monetary income 
accruing to agricultural producers in Kenya depends on the price and expenditure 
elasticities of demand of various foodstuffs and on the alternative uses to 
which resources devoted to "surplus" production can be diverted. 
A P P 3 r D I X 
FOOTNOTES 
1. G.K. Helleiner (1968) Agricultural export pricing strategy in Tanzania 
East African Journal of Rural Development I, ppl-17 
2. The opportunities for this type of action are now virtually non-existent as 
the demand curve facing Kenya for nearly all products is relatively elastic. 
Deliberately restricting supplies in order to raise world market prices 
may have accelerated the search for cheaper substitutes and synthetics. 
3. It is assumed throughout these pricing rules that in order" to achieve an 
optimum utilisation of resources producers should pay transport costs to 
the final market place. Some qualifications on this are given later. 
The concept of a single, unchanging world market price is admittedly naive -
in practice it is customary to avoid rapid and large changes in producer 
prices, by view on the likely long term trend of world market prices. How-
ever in loing this one foregoes some of the short term gains which might 
resv.lt from more rapid switches from crop to crop. 
4 . Holloiner op. cit. p 11 
